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Abstract—We present the MASSE architecture, a YARA-based
open source client-server malware detection platform. MASSE
includes highly effective automated syntactic malware detection
rule generation for the clients based on a server-side modular
malware detection system. Multiple techniques are used to make
MASSE effective at detecting malware while keeping it from
disrupting users and hindering reverse-engineering of its malware
analysis by malware creators.
I. CONTEXT
Effective malware detection is an important requirement to
guarantee system safety and user protection. Malware detec-
tion techniques based on syntactic signatures (or “rules”) [6],
[8] are commonly used in antivirus since their low computa-
tional cost allows them to be used on scan the files handled
by the system without excessively slowing down the system.
The open-source YARA tool [2] has recently gained popu-
larity due to its efficience, simple rule format, and variety of
implemented techniques. In fact, the YARA rule format has be-
come the de facto standard for sharing malware signatures [5].
However, it has not yet been integrated in a complete antivirus
architecture including sample analysis and fingerprinting, and
the rules used by it are commonly generated by hand or by
simple string subtraction techniques [3], [4].
The Modular Automated Syntactic Signature Extraction
(MASSE) architecture is a new integrated open source client-
server architecture for syntactic malware detection and anal-
ysis based on the YARA, developed with Teclib’. MASSE
integrates YARA in a distributed system able to detect malware
on endpoint systems using YARA, analyze malware with
multiple analysis techniques, automatically generate syntactic
malware detection rules, and deploy the new rules to the
endpoints. The MASSE architecture is freely available to com-
panies and institutions as a complete, modular, self-maintained
antivirus solution. Using MASSE, a security department can
immediately update the rule database of the whole company,
stopping an infection on its tracks and preventing future ones.
II. OBJECTIVE: A SMART, MODULAR, FREE ANTIVIRUS
The goal of MASSE is to create a highly automated malware
detection and analysis client-server architecture. No solution
controlled by third parties is required, allowing the user to
keep confidentiality on their files. Also, full control on the
system allows the user to react immediately in case of attack.
a) Architecture: The MASSE architecture is composed
of a client side and a server side where the server executes
the computationally-heavy malware analysis procedures in
an easily extendable and modular way, and based on this
analysis generates syntactic rules for lightweight malware
detection in the clients. The client performs YARA-based on-
access and on-demand malware analysis on the client’s system,
without consuming too much of the client system’s resources
or interfering on its normal usage. The server analyzes new
samples to detect malware using a modular system based on
multiple malware analysis modules. This produces the YARA
detection rules for the new malware, and pushes them to the
client’s rule database. The architecture is depicted in Fig. 1.
The MASSE source code is publicly available, not just
allowing for code analysis and auditing but also creating a
community of users and developers sharing improvements to
the system. The goal of MASSE is to create a community
of users improving the main code and implementing and
exchanging new malware modules and rule databases, just
like a similar community formed around the YARA tool. Still,
the architecture must hinder attempts by malware creators to
reverse-engineer the malware analysis to protect their malware
against it.
b) Modular Malware Analysis: Malware analysis and
rule generation are executed in a modular system with public
APIs, making them easily extensible and adaptable to the
users’ needs. Modules can use machine learning, static and
dynamic analysis, heuristic techniques and their own rule or
signature databases to perform malware analysis and provide a
classification result and possibly a confidence level. Also, each
module must implement logic to transform the information it
used to detect the malware in a fragment of a syntactic rule
that can be used by YARA.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This section presents the solution to achieve the goals
described in Section II.
a) Architecture: To guarantee that the architecture does
not interfere with the users, malware detection systems have
to have a very low positive rate, usually below 0.1% (and
0% on system files) to prevent raising false alarms that
would waste the user’s time and corrode their trust in the
system. MASSE’s rule generation uses multiple techniques to
reduce false positives. First of all, the server maintains a large
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Fig. 1. The MASSE client-server architecture. The server modularly analyzes new malware samples, generates syntactic rules to detect them, and updates
the client’s databases in a pseudonymous and compiled form. The clients run a detection system based on YARA.
whitelist of system files and relevant user files to guarantee
that the generated rules don’t detect any of them as malicious.
Rule update deployment uses canary testing, deploying first to
a subset of testing systems to check the impact of the update
before deployment to the whole system. Finally, rules contain
different layers of detection confidence, and the system reacts
accordingly. For instance, while a file classified as malware by
its hash will be immediately quarantined, one classified just
by some suspicious features can be transmitted to the server
for further analysis before blocking user access to it. Together,
these techniques guarantee that the generated YARA rules do
not interfere with the client’s systems.
The challenge of an open source architecture is to prevent
malware creators from reverse-engineering it to learn how to
shield their malware against it. To hinder reverse-engineering,
the malware analysis modules are actually kept and distributed
as obfuscated and closed source components (while the API
they use, the client, and the server are open source). Im-
portantly, these modules are only kept on the server, so that
compromising a client does not allow attackers to access them.
Finally, the YARA rule databases are delivered to the clients
in a compiled, pseudonymous format. Rule precompilation
increases YARA’s efficiency, while pseudonimity ensures that
even if an attacker was able to reverse-engineer the classifica-
tion of their malware they would not be sure of whether the
malware has been correctly identified. The clients have no in-
formation about the malware analysis techniques implemented
in the server; when a sample is identified, its pseudonym is
returned to the server that decodes it and proceeds accordingly.
b) Modular Malware Analysis: To achieve modularity in
both the malware analysis and rule generation process we must
understand how different types of malware analysis techniques
can contribute not only with a malware classification but
with syntactic properties representing the information that
the technique used to determine the classification. Techniques
that work directly on static properties like n-gram frequency,
metadata, binary header properties, import/export tables, and
entropy fingerprinting [1] can directly translate the most
relevant properties to fragments of YARA rules. Techniques
based on machine learning like classifiers and clustering
algorithms [7] can isolate the most relevant features used to
determine the classification or clustering of the given sample
and use them as fragments of YARA rules, also weighting
them by the relevance that each feature. Dynamic analysis
techniques can extract important values or strings that the
malware uses at runtime [8], like decryption keys, specific
URLs, or credentials, and write YARA rule fragments to detect
them statically in the binary.
Many of these techniques require their own signature
databases or trained classifiers to work. These can be up-
dated by the community with new signatures, as it happens
nowadays with YARA rules, and companies can sell advanced
analysis modules and subscription to updates of the modules
and modules’ databases as part of their business models.
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